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cology, both as a science and as a world view, emphasizes the study of relationships, 
interconnections, and environmental wholes that are different from the sum of their 
environmental parts. “Special qualities emerge out of interactions and collectivities,” writes 
intellectual historian Donald Worster (1994, p. 22), in his Nature’s Economy, a history of 
ecological ideas in the Western world.1 
 
E 
The central question I address here is this: What do the relationships, interconnections, and environmental 
wholes of ecology become in a phenomenological perspective?2 To examine this question, I consider one 
phenomenon from the natural world—color—and one phenomenon from the human-made world—lively 
urban places. I think it important to offer an example from both natural and human worlds because a 
“phenomenological ecology,” as it might be called, must be responsive to all lived relationships and 
interconnections, examining and describing the ways that things, living forms, people, events, situations 
and worlds come together to make environmental and human wholes (Riegner 1993, p. 211-12; Seamon 
1993, p. 16).3 
 
By “lively urban places,” I refer to city neighborhoods and districts that provide easy access for 
pedestrians and generate, just by being what they are, chance face-to-face encounters, sidewalk life, and a 
sense of taken-for-granted safety because many people are present. To discuss a phenomenology of lively 
urban places, I turn to my own work on the bodily dimensions of environmental experience and action, 
especially as the lived body comes to know its everyday environment through the regularity and routine of 
extended time-space patterns contributing to the transformation of physical space into lived place. I also 
emphasize, after architectural theorist Bill Hillier (1989, 1996; Hillier and Hanson 1984), that the physical 
structure of place, particularly the spatial configuration of pathways, plays a major role in establishing 
whether streets are well used and animated or empty and lifeless. In terms of relationships, 
interconnections, and environmental wholes, this discussion of lively urban places indicates how a 
particular fit between people and world contributes to a larger whole of interpersonal encounter, 
sociability, and place attachment.  
 
To discuss a phenomenology of color, I turn to the remarkable proto-phenomenology of German 
dramatist and poet Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832), who—more than a hundred years before 
Husserl formally laid out the phenomenological enterprise—devised a qualitative way of seeing and 
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understanding that can rightly be called a phenomenology of the natural world. Most significantly for a 
phenomenological understanding of relationships, interconnections and environmental wholes, Goethe’s 
work demonstrates how light and color involve an underlying “belonging” seen in perceptual presence but 
only understood through a moment of insight in which all the parts are understood together and have a 
fitting place. 
 
A Geography of the Lifeworld 
To move toward these phenomenologies of lively urban places and color, I want to provide some 
autobiographical background as to how I have become interested in two phenomena that, at first glance, 
might seem entirely unrelated thematically or conceptually. In the fall of 1970, I arrived as a graduate 
student at Worcester, Massachusett’s Clark University, where the two largest graduate programs are 
Psychology and Geography. In the early 1970s, there was an effort at Clark to capitalize on the combined 
strengths of these two graduate programs and to establish an interdisciplinary doctoral program in 
environment-behavior research, a field of study that might most succinctly be defined as the study of how 
the physical and built environments contribute to human well being. 
 
At that time, most programs in the human and social sciences were largely positivist and emphasized 
deductive theory, hypothesis testing, measurement, and quantitative demonstration. In environment-
behavior research, a priori theories and concepts predominated, and I was exposed to such conceptual 
points of view as cognitive mapping, environmental perception, territoriality, theories of environmental 
preference, and the like. To me as an academic neophyte, these theories and concepts seemed too often 
reductive, cartoon versions of the lived richness of my own environmental actions, experiences, and 
situations. 
 
Fortunately for me, in 1970 there also arrived at Clark a young faculty member named Anne Buttimer 
who, through the Continental traditions of phenomenology and existentialism, was seeking a more 
comprehensive and thoughtful way of understanding peoples’ day-to-day actions and experiences with 
their physical, spatial, and social environments (Buttimer 1976, 1987; Buttimer and Seamon 1980; 
Seamon 1987; Seamon 2004). She was especially interested in how peoples’ lived links with place and 
environment might be understood through the phenomenological notion of lifeworld—the taken-for-
granted fabric and dynamic of everyday life that largely happens automatically without conscious 
attention or deliberate plan. She argued that environmental aspects of lifeworld—for example, sense of 
place, social space, time-space rhythms and the lived dialectic between home and horizon—might offer a 
uniquely geographical and environmental contribution to phenomenological research (Buttimer 1976, p. 
277). 
My Clark dissertation, revised and published in 1979 as A Geography of the Lifeworld (Seamon 1979), 
focused on a wide-ranging phenomenon that I called everyday environmental experience—the sum total 
of peoples’ firsthand involvements with the geographical world in which they live. By geographical 
world, I meant the everyday places, spaces, and environments in which people find themselves. My 
source of experiential descriptions was environmental experience groups, small groups of students and 
other interested participants who were willing to meet weekly to examine in their own daily experience 
such themes as movement patterns, emotions relating to place, the nature of noticing and attention, the 
meaning of home and at-homeness, places for things, deciding where to go when, and so forth. 
Through a phenomenological explication of the more than 1,500 personal observations offered in these 
environmental experience groups, I eventually arrived at three overarching themes—movement, rest, and 
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encounter—that appeared to mark the essential core of everyday environmental experience. The section 
on movement examined the habitual nature of everyday environmental behaviors and argued, after French 
phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962), that the lived foundation of these behaviors is the body 
as preconscious but intelligent subject. The section on rest explored people’s attachment to place and gave 
particular attention to at-homeness and positive affective relationships with places and environments.  
The book’s final section on encounter considered the multifaced ways in which people make attentive 
contact with their world. Group observations indicated that this range of awareness extends from 
obliviousness and minimal attentive contact with the world at hand through watching, noticing, and more 
intense kinds of encounter where the experiencer, at least metaphorically, feels a sense of “merging” with 
some aspect of world. The last section of the book examined lived relationships and interconnections 
among movement, rest, and encounter and argued that their threefold structure offered one simple but 
integrated way to envision human environmental experience conceptually and to think about design and 
policy implications practically. 
Habitual Bodies and Place Ballet 
To move toward a phenomenology of lively urban places, I want to summarize the book’s conclusions on 
everyday movement, by which I meant “any displacement of the body or bodily parts initiated by the 
person himself or herself” (ibid., p. 33). One of the first themes that came forth in the environmental 
experience groups was the importance of habitual movement in everyday life. Group observations 
suggested that, regardless of the particular environmental scale at which they happen, many movements 
are conducted by some preconscious impulse that guides behaviors without the person’s need to be 
consciously aware of their happening. As one group member succinctly described the process of walking 
from her apartment to the university, “You get up and go without really thinking, you know exactly where 
you have to go, and you get there but you really don’t think about getting there while you’re on your 
way.” This observation points to a kind of automatic unfolding of movement with which the group 
member has little or no conscious contact. She has no recollection of the great number of footsteps, turns, 
stops, and starts that in sum compose the walks from home to school. She finds herself at her destination 
without having paid the least bit of attention to the movement as it happened at the time. 
 
“Body-subject” is the term that Merleau-Ponty used in his Phenomenology of Perception to describe the 
intentional but taken-for-granted intelligence of the body indicated by the group observation just cited.  
“Consciousness,” he wrote (Merleau-Ponty 1962, pp. 138-39) “is being toward the thing through the 
intermediary of the body. A movement is learned when the body has understood it, that is, when it has 
incorporated it into its ‘world’, and to move one’s body is to aim at things through it; it is to allow oneself 
to respond to their call…. In order that we may be able to move our body towards an object, the object 
must first exist for it, our body must not belong to the realm of the ‘in-itself’.” 
 
Though Merleau-Ponty said very little about larger-scale actions of body-subject in Phenomenology of 
Perception, observations from the environmental experience groups pointed to its versatility as expressed 
in more complex movements and behaviors extending over time and space.4 One such behavior indicated 
by group observations is what I called body routine—a set of integrated gestures, behaviors, and actions 
that sustain a particular task or aim, for example, washing dishes, driving a car, doing home repair, and so 
forth. Also indicated by group observations was what I labeled a  time-space routine—a set of more or 
less habitual bodily actions that extends through a considerable portion of time—for example, a getting-
up routine or a weekday going-to-lunch routine. 
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Most important for the phenomenon of lively urban places, group observations suggested that, in a 
supportive physical environment, individual body and time-space routines may fuse together in a larger 
whole, creating an environmental dynamic that I called, after the earlier observations of urban critic Jane 
Jacobs (1961, p. 50), a  place ballet—an interaction of time-space routines and body routines rooted in 
space, which often becomes an important place of interpersonal and communal exchange and meaning. 
 
Place ballet may occur at all manner of environmental scales—inside, outside; at the level of 
neighborhood, street, public space, building interior, and so forth. A popular and well-used plaza like New 
York City’s Greenacre Park may be the scene of place ballet (Whyte 1980), or it may be an animated 
stretch of city street (Jacobs 1961), or a weekly outdoor market (Seamon and Nordin 1980), or a popular 
café or tavern (Oldenburg 1989). Place ballet should not be envisioned as a regimented ensemble of 
robotlike participants moving about in mindless precision but, rather, as a fluid environmental dynamic 
that allows for temporal give and take as participants are present more or less regularly, at more or less the 
same times. Newcomers, outsiders and infrequent participants may contribute to place ballet, but its 
foundation is some degree of environmental and temporal regularity founded in body-subject.5  
 
Spatial Configuration and Place Ballet 
I next want to examine how qualities of the world, particularly its physical, potentially-designable 
features, might sustain and enhance the time-space manifestations of body-subject, particularly place 
ballet. One body of work significant for addressing this question is architectural theorist Bill Hillier’s 
theory of space syntax, which provides convincing conceptual and empirical evidence that the physical-
spatial environment plays an integral part in sustaining active streets and an urban sense of place (Hillier 
1996; Hillier and Hanson 1984). 
 
Though Hillier’s work is not phenomenological, it has crucial significance phenomenologically because it 
demonstrates how a world’s underlying spatial structure, or configuration, as Hillier calls it, guides particular 
actions and circulations of human bodies moving through that world and, how, in turn, a self-conscious 
understanding of this human world/physical world intimacy might lead to environmental design and policy 
that supports a stronger sense of place and community. 
 
In his work, Hillier asks whether there is some “deep structure of the city itself” that contributes to urban 
life (Hillier 1989, p. 5). He finds this deep structure in the relationship between spatial configuration and 
natural co-presence—that is, the way the spatial layout of pathways can informally and automatically 
bring people together in urban space or keep them apart: “By its power to generate movement, spatial 
design creates a fundamental pattern of co-presence and co-awareness, and therefore potential encounter 
amongst people that is the most rudimentary form of our awareness of others” (Hillier 1996, p. 213). I 
have already argued above that the lived basis for this human movement and co-presence may be in many 
instances the regularity of habitual bodies. Drawing on Hillier’s work, we can examine how these habitual 
bodies make use of or do not make use of particular pathways, largely because of the particular spatial 
configuration of those pathways. 
 
In seeking to understand the ways that pathway configuration relates to human movement, co-presence, and 
encounter, Hillier develops the concept of axial space, which relates to linear qualities of space. Axial spaces 
are illustrated most perfectly by long narrow streets and can be represented geometrically by the maximum 
straight line that can be drawn through an open space before it strikes a building, wall, or some other material 
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object. For example, the axial map for the small southern French village of Gassin, one of the first 
settlements that Hillier studied, is illustrated in figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Axial map for the small French village of Gassin generated by drawing the longest possible lines through the 
settlement’s outdoor fabric of streets, plazas, and other public spaces (from Hillier and Hanson 1984, p. 91). 
 
Partly through quantitative and computer analysis, Hillier concludes that axial spaces are significant for 
understanding a settlement’s global pattern—that is, the way the particular spatial configuration of a pathway 
fabric lays out a potential movement field that draws people together or keeps them apart.6 Natural movement 
is the term Hillier uses to describe the potential power of the pathway layout to automatically stymie or 
facilitate movement and such related environmental events as co-presence, co-awareness, informal 
interpersonal encounters, and animated street activity (Hillier 1996, p. 161). 
 
To establish precisely the amount of natural movement that a particular pathway configuration potentially 
generates, Hillier introduces the concepts of integrated and segregated pathways. As illustrated in figure 2, 
the former is a pathway that makes itself readily accessible to many other pathways and therefore is shallow 
in relation to them. In other words, many other pathways and the users on these pathways feed into this 
pathway, thus it is well integrated in relation to the surrounding grid structure and more than likely a well-
used route along which many people travel. In contrast, few or no other routes feed into segregated 
pathways, which are poorly accessible and deep in relation to the surrounding grid. Segregated pathways 
typically are dead ends or elements in treelike grids; one thinks, for example, of the “cul-de-sac and loop” 
pattern of low-density, automobile-dependent suburbs, or the hierarchical circulation layouts of many 
modernist housing estates. 
 
To measure and map the relative integration of all pathways in a particular pathway system, Hillier develops 
a quantitative procedure that he calls measure of integration (Hillier and Hanson 1984, pp. 108-09). One 
product of this procedure is an integration map like the one for Gassin in figure 2, which summarizes the 
integration values for all pathways in the village. The streets marked by solid lines depict the village’s 
integration core—those streets that have many other streets feeding into them. These streets have the most 
chance for being alive with street activity, public life, and commerce. In contrast, the hatched lines identify 
Gassin’s segregation core—the streets that deflect activity away from themselves and therefore indicate 
pockets of quiet and seclusion that are typically residential in character.7 
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Integrated and segregated pathways
• Integrated pathways:
pathways that make 
themselves readily 
accessible to other 
pathways. In other words, 
many other pathways 
feed into them.
• Segregated pathways: 
pathways that do not 
make themselves readily 
accessible to other 
pathways. In other words, 
few or no other pathways 
feed into them.
3
1
2
 
Figure 2. Integrated and segregated pathways. In this hypothetical street grid, street 1 is the most integrated pathway, 
since five other streets feed into it. On the other hand, street 3 is most segregated, since it is a dead end. Street 2 is more 
integrated than street 3 but less integrated than street 1. All other factors being equal (e.g., density, placement of 
functions, and building types), street 1 should carry the most pedestrians (see endnote 6). 
 
 
Figure 3. Gassin's "deformed wheel." Note that the streets of greatest integration (and thus most potential movement) 
are marked by the solid lines, whose shape roughly suggests a wheel and spokes; in contrast, the hatched lines indicate 
streets of greater segregation, which, overall, are residential and between the more active thoroughfares (from Hillier 
and Hanson, 1984, p. 117). 
Hillier next considers whether these lines of greater and lesser integration indicate some deeper 
configurational structure underlying the settlement as a whole. In fact, after studying the integration and 
segregation cores of many settlements, both Western and non-Western, Hillier concludes that such a larger 
global structure exists, which he calls the deformed wheel (see figure 3). The rim, spokes, and hub of this 
wheel are the pathways with high integration values (in figure 3, the solid lines). Typically, these streets are 
the most used by a settlement’s residents and are also the main entry routes and therefore used by 
“outsiders”—for example, a farmer bringing his produce to weekly market or tourists exploring the 
 6
settlement. Also, most of the largest public spaces and location-dependent uses, like shops, are on the most 
integrated streets of the deformed wheel, since these streets are the places of greatest movement. 
 
In the interstices between the most active streets are typically the most segregated, less used pathways (in 
figure 3, the hatched lines). Hillier concludes that, for many traditional settlements, the most active areas abut 
the quietest areas: the places of street life, publicness, and strangers’ mixing with residents are a short 
distance from the more private areas used mostly by residents only. Movement and rest, activity and place, 
journey and dwelling, difference and locality, publicness and home, lie apart yet together! 
 
In regard to cities, Hillier demonstrates that most urban pathway systems have traditionally been an 
integrated fabric of smaller deformed wheels (usually associated with designated neighborhoods and 
districts—for example, London’s Soho, Bloomsbury, or City), whose most integrated pathways join together 
to shape a much larger deformed grid that founds the dynamic of natural movement for the city as a whole 
(Hillier 1996, chap. 4). “[E]ach local area,” explains Hillier (ibid., p. 171), “has its heart linked to the 
supergrid lines that surround it by strong integrators. These form an edge-to-centre structure in all directions, 
and the less-integrated areas are within the interstices formed by the structure….” 
 
Hillier is highly critical of most twentieth-century urban design and planning because it often eviscerated this 
relationship between local and global integration by replacing integrated pathway configurations with treelike 
systems of segregated pathways. The long-term result is that these “spatial designs create serious lacunas in 
natural movement,” which in turn undermines the informal sociability of streets and neighborhoods and may 
in time attract “anti-social uses and behaviours”—for example, unsafe streets and higher crime rates, 
particularly in the mazelike pathway systems of many post-World War II public housing projects (ibid., p. 
178). From a place ballet perspective, one can say that the possibility of individual habitual bodies easily 
coming together in co-presence has been greatly compromised because the particular pathway configuration 
does not direct movement from less integrated pathways onto more integrated pathways that would then 
become spaces of animated pedestrian activity.    
 
Relationships, Interconnections, Wholes, and Place Ballet 
What does the above discussion of lively urban place as interpreted through place ballet and space syntax 
say about relationships, interconnections, and environmental wholes interpreted phenomenologically? 
First, in terms of relationships, one can say that place ballet automatically gathers time, space, and 
peoples’ needs through the taken-for-granted unfolding of bodily regularity. Both the result and source of 
this tacit unfolding is a series of automatic interconnections: between an individual’s routine and others’ 
routines; between those routines and the settings, origins, and destinations in which and for which the 
routines unfold; between body-subject’s actions and a supportive spatial configuration incorporating some 
pathways that are well used and lively and other pathways, traditionally residential, that are less used and 
quiet.  The result is an environmental whole that is integrated, ordered, alive, and a new entity of place 
considerably different from its human and environmental parts. 
 
What I’m suggesting here is that a phenomenology of lively urban places indicates how a particular fit 
between people—specifically, habitual bodies—and world—specifically, particular pathway pattern—
supports physical co-presence and potential encounter that may facilitate sociability and a sense of 
community and neighborhood. Hillier’s demonstration of how a particular pattern of spatial 
configuration—the deformed grid—has the potential to found a nexus of lively pedestrian movement 
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illustrates in a remarkably new way the basic phenomenological principle that people are immersed in 
world as world is immersed in people. 
 
In relation to habitual bodies meeting in space that is transformed into place, Hillier’s work concludes that 
a major need is permeability—the relative accessibility of a place, which in turn relates to the number of 
alternative routes running through that place and the potential amount of human movement, exchange, 
and interaction thus facilitated. Such an interconnected pathway network, on one hand, encourages ease of 
access and greater spread of movement; on the other hand, a permeable network discourages inefficient 
movement and the frustration of impenetrability. Design-wise, the setting most likely to facilitate place 
ballet involves well-connected streets, small blocks, mixed uses, and humanly-scaled buildings whose 
footprints, entries, and windows have a direct relationship to the sidewalk and street (Bentley et al. 1985). 
 
In today’s American context, where the minimally permeable, low-density, functionally-separated suburb 
is the norm, the need is fine-grained, mixed-use, gridded neighborhoods that potentially have the power to 
rekindle informal interpersonal interactions, lively streets, and neighborhood place ballet. One 
controversial example is the “New Urbanism”—a design effort to create walkable, mixed-use 
neighborhoods with coherent public spaces sustaining informal sociability (Bothwell et al., 2002, Katz 
1994, Robbins 2004). 
 
Having considered lively urban places as one way to focus the phenomenological meaning of 
relationships, interconnections, and environmental wholes, I next turn to Goethe’s way of science as a 
means to explore a phenomenon of the natural world—the appearance of color. With that discussion in 
place, I can conclude by seeking broader implications of my two phenomenologies, thus identifying more 
general qualities and patterns of relationships, interconnections, and wholes examined 
phenomenologically. 
 
Goethe’s Way of Science 
In 1972 while I was a graduate student at Clark University, I had the opportunity to meet and briefly study 
with physicist Henri Bortoft, who would eventually write Wholeness of Nature (Bortoft 1996), without a 
doubt the single best explication of Goethean science, especially as it has significance for environmental 
education and ethics.8 After that brief encounter, which opened me to a new style of phenomenology, I 
carefully followed research in Goethean science and, in 1998, with physicist Arthur Zajonc published 
Goethe’s Way of Science: A Phenomenology of Nature, an edited collection providing examples of recent 
Goethean research involving such phenomena as plants, animals, and the movement of water. 
 
Though Goethe is much better known as a superb poet and playwright, he also produced a considerable 
body of scientific work that focused on such aspects of the natural world as light, color, plants, clouds, 
weather, and geology. In its time, Goethe’s way of science was highly unusual because it moved away 
from a quantitative, analytic approach to the natural world and emphasized, instead, an intimate firsthand 
encounter between the student and thing studied. Direct experiential contact coupled with prolonged, 
attentive efforts to look and see became the basis for descriptive generalization and synthetic 
understanding. 
 
To illustrate Goethe’s approach to seeing and understanding things in nature, I want to focus on his work 
dealing with light and color because it offers perhaps the clearest explication of Goethe’s 
phenomenological method. Skeptical of Newton's color theory (which claimed that colors are contained in 
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colorless light and arise, for example, through refraction in a prism), Goethe began his studies of color in the 
late 1780s and published the results of his work, Theory of Color (Zur Farbenlehre), in 1810 (Goethe 1970, 
Goethe 1988). The crux of his color theory is its experiential source: rather than impose theoretical 
statements (as he felt Newton had), Goethe sought a means to allow light and color to reveal themselves 
directly through our own human experience. 
 
To understand Goethe’s style of looking and seeing, I want to focus on the prism experiments in part two of 
Theory of Color. These easy-to-do exercises are a helpful way to introduce students to phenomenological 
looking because a phenomenon is present—the appearance of color in a prism—which, on one hand, most 
people are unfamiliar with yet which, on the other hand, can be readily examined, described, and verified 
through sustained work with the prisms. Table 1 indicates the kind of questions one should keep in mind in 
doing these experiments and, for that matter, all Goethean science. 
 
 
Goethean Looking and Seeing: 
Questions to Keep in Mind 
• What do I see? 
• What is happening? 
• What is this saying? 
• How is this coming to be? 
• What belongs together? 
• What remains apart? 
• How does this belong together with itself? 
• Is it itself? 
• Can I read this in itself? 
 
 
Table 1. Questions to keep in mind for Goethean looking and seeing. 
 
Participants are asked to begin by simply looking through the prism, seeking to become more and more 
familiar with what is seen. They record their observations in words and colored drawings. Ideally, the 
experiments are done by a group of four or five, so that participants can report their observations to each 
other and bring forth descriptive claims that other participants can then confirm or reject, drawing on their 
own looking and seeing. Gradually, the group moves toward a consensus as to exactly how, where, and in 
what manner colors appear. 
 
Let me emphasize that this process of seeing accurately is not easy or fast. Many participants first starting 
the exercise expect to see color everywhere or, with vague memories of high school physics in mind, expect 
a full-color rainbow to appear, which in fact does not readily happen. Once participants bracket their 
expectations and begin to really look at the colors as they actually appear, participants often present 
observations that are vague or incorrect: for example, "I see a halo of color around all objects" or "colors 
only appear where there is light." Neither of these observations is correct and indicate the misreading and 
imprecision into which beginners can fall. 
 
In short, this process of looking requires continual presentation, corroboration, recognition of error, and 
correction. Eventually, however, group members can establish a thorough picture of their experience of 
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color through the prism and end with a set of generalizations like the accurate descriptive statements 
presented in table 2. 
 
 
Looking through a Prism: 
Exemplary Descriptions 
• Black, white, and uniformly pure surfaces show no color through the prism; 
rather, colors only appear at edges, which can be defined as places of 
contrast made by darkness and lightness. 
• Colors, however, do not appear along all edges; rather they appear only 
along edges that are more or less parallel to the axis of the prim. 
• The more marked and strong the edge of darkness and light, the brighter 
and more lively the colors. 
• Usually, the colors at the edges arrange themselves in two different groups: 
a yellow-orange-red group; and a blue-indigo-violet group. 
• Less frequently, the colors green and magenta appear. 
 
 
Table 2. Some examples of accurate descriptive statements arising from looking through prism. 
 
Seeing and Understanding Broader Patterns 
The general exercise of looking through the prism just described is excellent for introducing students to 
the effort, care, and persistence required in Goethe’s approach to looking and seeing, but his aim is 
considerably larger: to discover a theory of color that arises from the colors themselves through our 
growing awareness and familiarity of them. Here, we move into a stage of looking and seeing that 
explores the wholeness of color by describing in what ways colors arrange themselves in relationship to 
each other and to the darkness-lightness edge that, as discovered in the prism exercise just described, 
seems to be a prerequisite for any colors to arise at all.  
 
To identify such patterns and relationships, Goethe presents a series of experiments using a set of cards 
with black and white patterns that are to be viewed carefully through the prism and then to be recorded 
accurately. The cards to be discussed here are illustrated in figure 4, and instructions for their use is 
provided in table 3.  
 
The value of the cards in these experiments is that they provide a simple way to direct the appearance of 
color and, thereby, provide a more manageable and dependable context for looking and describing. Rather 
than seeing color along any edge, participants are now all looking at the same edge displaced in the same 
way so they can be certain that they will see the same appearance of colors.  
 
In regard to card A, for example, we begin with the white area above the black and, through the prism, 
look at the white-black horizontal edge in the middle of the card. If the image that we see is displaced by 
the prism below the actual card, then at the edge we see the darker colors of blue above violet (see figure 
5). If we turn the card upside down so that black is above white, we now see something quite different—a 
set of lighter edge colors that, from top down, are orange-red and yellow (see figure 6). 
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Cards for Prism Experiments
• A card equally divided into 
black and white portions 
(card A)
• A card that has a white 
elongated rectangle 
surrounded by black (card 
B).
• A card that has a black 
elongated rectangle 
surrounded by white (card 
C).
For best results, these cards should be 
duplicated, cut out, and mounted on cardboard 
so that they can be easily handled. Also colored 
pencils should be available so that participants 
can make quick drawings of their observations.
A
B
C
 
 
Figure 4. The three cards to be viewed through a prism (Goethe 1970). 
 
 
Five Prism Experiments 
• Experiment 1. Hold card A with the white area above and black below. Making 
sure that all participants' images are displaced by the prism in the same direction 
(i.e., either above or below), locate the card's black-white edge in the prism. 
What colors appear along the edge? Draw and identify. 
• Experiment 2. Invert card A so that the black area is now at the top and white at 
the bottom. What colors now appear along the edge? Draw and identify.  
• Experiments 3a & 3b. Repeat situations 1 and 2, but this time assure that the 
image of the card's edge is displaced in the opposite way (if down before, now 
up and vice versa). 
• Experiment 4. Look at card B so that the long axis of the white rectangle is 
parallel to the prism axis. Observe and describe the colors that appear on the 
upper and lower edges of the white rectangle. Slowly move card B away until it 
is at an arm’s length. As you move the card, observe and describe any color 
changes. What new color appears? 
• Experiment 5. Using card C, carry through the same procedure as with card B. 
What new color appears? 
 
Table 3. Five prism experiments from Theory of Color (Goethe 1970). 
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Experiment 1 (image displaced downward)
Blue
Violet
   
 
Experiment 2 (image displaced downward)
Orange-
Red
Yellow
 
 
Figures 5 and 6, illustrating card experiments 1 and 2 (results of experiments 3a and 3b not shown). 
 
Experiment 4 (image displaced downward)
Yellow
Blue
Violet
Orange-Red
GREEN
 
 
Figure 7 illustrating card experiment 4. 
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Experiment 5 (image displaced downward)
Violet
Orange-Red
Yellow
Blue
MAGENTA
 
 
Figure 8 illustrating card experiment 5. 
 
As figures 7 and 8 indicate, the experiments with cards B and C are perhaps the most intriguing because 
they generate two colors not as regularly seen as in the dominant spectra of yellow-orange-red and blue-
indigo-violet. As one moves card B farther away toward arm’s length, there is a point at which the yellow 
and blue edges merge, and a vivid green appears horizontally so that the original white rectangle is now a 
band of rainbow (figure 7). For card C, a similar point is reached where the red and violet edges merge to 
create a brilliant magenta (figure 8). 
 
Allowing the Parts to Belong 
I have discussed a portion of the procedure that Goethe used to introduce participants to colors’ prismatic 
appearance, and now I want to highlight the style of looking and seeing more precisely. In working in the 
way that Goethe required, it is important to emphasize that participants must be active in their seeing. They 
must not merely observe what they see as passive spectators but plunge into the looking—they must, 
literally, “pay attention” so that they see with intention rather than just have a visual impression. 
 
For Goethe, however, these efforts of active looking and seeing are not enough. Once the participant gains 
familiarity with the particular patterns seen (for example, black above white generating red-orange-yellow), 
then the next step is what Goethe called “exact sensorial imagination”—in other words, visualizing and 
thinking the phenomenon concretely in imagination. For example, I picture myself holding the black-above-
white card, picture the displacement of the prism, picture the red-yellow-edge, then picture myself turning 
the card upside down and seeing the new edge of blue-indigo-violet. 
 
Notice here that there is now an action that is simultaneously outer and inner as well as perceptual and 
cognitive—I re-experience my perceptual seeing but do it in my mind’s eye. As Bortoft explains, “I am 
giving thinking more the quality of perception and sensory observation more the quality of thinking” 
(Borotoft 1996, 42). What I have just encountered in perception is transcribed into an intellectual picture, 
but that intellectual picture is held to accurate transcription by the original reality of my perceptual looking 
and seeing. 
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An important result in Goethe’s color experiments is that we begin to realize various necessary connections 
among the colors—for example, we recognize that blue, indigo, and violet always appear together, as do 
yellow, orange, and red. In this sense, says Bortoft, we see colors “belonging” in a non-contingent 
“togetherness” that is not determinable from just looking alone. The perception here of necessary 
connection “is the perception of a relationship as a real factor in the phenomenon, instead of being only a 
mental abstraction added on to what is experienced with the senses” (Bortoft, 1996, 99). 
 
Moving out into Nature 
In regard to his prism experiments, Goethe realized that light and darkness were integral to the appearance 
of the colors. He saw the prism, however, as a complicating factor in that it was required for the colors to 
appear. If, instead, he could find some situation in nature where colors arose all by themselves, then he 
would be able to locate the source of color in nature itself. He called such a foundational situation the “ur-
phenomenon” (Urphänomen)–the deep-down or primal phenomenon that marks out a necessary pattern of 
relationship. 
 
In time, Goethe concluded that the ur-phenomenon of color is the reciprocity of darkness and light or, more 
precisely, that color is the resolution of the tension between darkness and light. Thus, darkness lightened by 
light leads to the darker colors of blue, indigo, and violet, while light dimmed by darkness creates the lighter 
colors of yellow, orange, and red. As Goethe poetically summarized the situation, colors are the “deeds and 
sufferings of light.” 
 
As figure 9 indicates, Goethe believed that he had discovered color’s ur-phenomenon in his observations of 
the sun, sky, and landscape. On clear days he noticed that the sun directly overhead at midday is a yellow-
white, whereas the same sun setting is often orange or red. He also saw that the sky overhead is a brilliant, 
darker blue, whereas toward the horizon its blue shade grows lighter.  In a similar way, he noticed that, 
when looking at a series of receding mountain ridges, the nearer mountains are shades of indigo and violet, 
while the ridges farther in the distance are blue. 
 
The Ur-Phenomenon of Color 
In the upper example, a semi-transparent medium in front of  
light generates the lighter colors of yellow, orange and red. In
the lower example, the same semi-transparent medium in 
front of darkness generates the darker colors of blue, indigo, 
and violet.
 
 
Figure 9. Goethe’s ur-phenomenon of color as evoked by a semi-transparent medium. 
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In all these instances, Goethe interpreted the layer of atmosphere between him and the thing seen as a semi-
transparent medium that, depending on the situation, works as a layer of light or darkness and thereby 
generates lighter or darker colors. In front of the white brilliance of the sun, this atmosphere is turbid and 
thus darker. Depending on its thickness, this translucent medium makes the sun’s color appear yellow at 
midday or red at dusk and dawn. 
 
On the other hand, this same turbid atmosphere in front of the blackness of space or the dark green of distant 
mountain slopes works as a lightness, thus the sky at the horizon, with more atmosphere between me than 
the sky directly above, is a lighter shade of blue that the sky above. Similarly, the mountain ridges farther 
from me have more atmosphere in between than the ridges nearer, so the distant ridges appear blue while 
those nearer are indigo and violet. 
 
Unlike Newton, who theorized that colors are entities that have merely arisen out of light (as, for example, 
through refraction in a prism), Goethe came to believe that colors are new formations that develop through 
the dialectical action between darkness and light. Darkness is not the passive absence of light as Newton 
suggested but, rather, an active presence opposing itself to light and interacting with it. Goethe’s central aim 
in Theory of Color was to provide a way to demonstrate firsthand this dialectical relationship and color as its 
result. 
 
Engendering Reverence for Nature 
Whereas conventional analytical science emphasizes a knowledge of primary qualities—i.e., features of 
quantity like number, size, and position that can be measured and thereby transformed into a mathematical 
model—Goethe sought a science of qualities—a method whereby color becomes visible as intelligible 
within itself—i.e., without some external explanatory agency like “angle of refraction” or “wave length” that 
lies outside color as color appears. 
 
Rather, in Goethe’s way of science, colors in everyday experience—e.g., the color edges made by the prism 
or the changing colors of sun and sky—are now understood to have an intrinsic necessity and therefore are 
understandable in themselves.9 He sought to locate, through direct experience, the relationships and 
interconnections among the colors. His resulting theory, as Bortoft emphasizes (1996, p. 33) is a 
phenomenology of color rather than an explanatory model. 
 
There is nothing wrong with a quantitative science that gives attention to the progressive appearance of the 
natural world in its mathematical aspect, but this analytical interpretation is only partial. The natural world 
may be capable of appearing in other ways if approached accordingly. This is Goethe’s great contribution: 
he pointed the way toward a complementary way of study that allows our thinking to enter into the coming 
into being of the phenomenon instead of analyzing in secondhand fashion what has already become (Bortoft 
1996). 
 
For me personally, what is most inspiring about Goethe’s Theory of Color is its facilitating a kind of 
“folding over” of natural phenomena so that things unjoined before in understanding now connect in 
relationship. Phenomenological geographer Edward Relph says that the best phenomenology is the 
“gathering together of what already belongs together even while apart” (Relph 1983, 201). Theory of Color 
offers such a gathering admirably, fostering an awareness and understanding of color that parties can see 
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and agree on once they have worked through Goethe’s experiments. The result might be called a 
phenomenology of intersubjective corroboration and a science of qualities. 
 
It is also important to emphasize that today Goethe’s approach is being applied to many other topics in the 
natural world and leading to innovative practical results. One example is ecologist Mark Riegner’s 
pioneering efforts to use plants and animals as a means to “read” the unique sense of place of particular 
ecological regions (Riegner 1993, 1998). Another example is the work of animal researchers Wofgang 
Schad (1977) and Craig Holdrege (1998, 2003), who seek to render a Goethean phenomenology of 
animals through qualities of animal form, appearance, and behavior. I particularly admire sculptor John 
Wilkes’ efforts at a Goethean study of water and the crafting of fountainlike vessels he calls flowforms, 
which allow water to move in a lemniscate rhythm that is not only attractive aesthetically but also 
provides important ecological functions, including oxygenating water more quickly and thus having 
important value for wastewater treatment (Riegner and Wilkes 1998, Wilkes 2003).  
 
The Becoming of Parts Together 
I now want to return to the original question of what interconnections, relationships, and wholes become 
phenomenologically. In the style of phenomenology I argue for here, the quest is “right parts all of a 
piece”—in other words, a mutual coming to presence of parts and whole through a sustained effort to look 
and resulting moments of insight in which one “sees.”  
 
This style of phenomenology is arduous in practice and uncertain in results. Bortoft (1985, p. 287) 
identifies the central dilemma as the “hazard of emergence”—on the one hand, a part is only a part if it 
contributes to the whole to which it belongs; on the other hand, the whole can only emerge if it allows the 
parts to appear. As Bortoft explains, “the whole depends on the parts to be able to come forth, and the 
parts depend on the coming forth of the whole to be significant instead of superficial. The recognition of a 
part is possible only through the ‘coming to presence’ of the whole” (ibid.). 
 
What is the foundational “stuff” that grounds and allows for this coming to presence? For Bortoft, it is a 
situation in which all the parts have their proper place and can be together in a way that is real and non-
arbitrary. In short, there is a genuine belonging that both sustains and reflects a whole all part and parcel.10 
 
In both my phenomenology of lively urban places and in Goethe’s phenomenology of color, there is an 
effort to locate and describe necessary relationships and interconnections that both contribute to and are 
shaped by a belonging together in which the parts are integral and have their place. The integral parts of 
place ballet are individual habitual bodies in synchrony with a supportive spatial configuration that 
generates animated streets and places. The integral parts of Goethe’s color theory are the tension between 
darkness and light and the colors resulting from light overcoming darkness and vice versa. 
 
Obviously, these two phenomena involve different aspects of the lifeworld: bodily routine and place ballet 
exist largely in the natural attitude outside of self-conscious awareness, while discoveries evoked by 
Goethean science involve a patient, deliberate attention whereby taken-for-granted aspects of the world 
emerge reflexively. I would phrase this difference in terms of two contrasting modes of daily life—what I 
called in Geography of the Lifeworld (Seamon 1979) the triad of habituality and the triad of openness. 
The former refers to the typical ordinariness and humdrum of everyday life, which much of the time 
involves unquestioned repetition and routine that most people, unless forced, are unwilling to change. One 
fruitful means by which to introduce useful shifts in the triad of habituality is through thoughtful design of 
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the physical environment as demonstrated, for example, by Hillier’s space syntax work, which provides 
ways whereby spatial configuration might be used to generate animated urban places through place ballet. 
 
In contrast to the triad of habituality is the triad of openness—those moments in everyday life when one is 
suddenly alert to the world in a more sensitive, intense way, and one experiences a heightened encounter 
with the world. As I hope the above explication of Goethe’s color work indicates, his way of science can 
be an important tool for moving people into the triad of openness. By practicing a way of encountering 
the world in an empathetic, participatory way, Goethe believes that what is taken for granted and thus 
unseen can reveal new patterns  in which parts that were before unrelated now belong in a non-contingent 
togetherness.  
 
I realize that, in our time of poststructural relativity, any emphasis on necessary relationships and 
interconnections founded on a noncontingent “belonging” will strike some critics as an experiential 
essentialism associated with a conservative phenomenology that still believes in the “things themselves.” On 
one hand, I do believe that the relationships of necessity that Goethe reveals in his color theory and the body-
space structure of place ballet are real lifeworld structures that can be discovered through careful study and 
description of typical environmental and place experiences. On the other hand, one most also realize that 
place ballets and the signficance of color are always expressed through particular cultural, social, and 
personal filters. In short, there is always a lived dialectic between the more general and the more specific, the 
foundational and the particular way the foundational is expressed in the real-world life of particular people in 
particular places at particular historical moments. My personal study preference lingers with the foundational. 
 
I have emphasized lively urban places and colors here because I have a particular interest in 
phenomenological insights as they might reach into the world of praxis. Phenomenological research on 
place ballet might not only sensitize individuals and groups to particular places that have important 
signficance in their own lives but might also offer practical means for strengthening those places through 
policy and design. Goethe’s way of science I find particularly significant practically because it offers a 
comprehensive, intuitive means for encountering the lifeworld and finding unsuspected interconnections 
among parts that suddenly merge together in wider patterns of relationship and meaning. One feels 
satisfaction intellectually but is also surprised and touched emotionally.  
 
The African-British novelist Doris Lessing (1969, p. 10) writes that love is “the delicate but total 
acknowledgement of what is,” and her idea crystallizes the heart of Goethean seeing: that the mundane, 
little things of our world can house a miraculous wholeness that we can encounter, understand, and come 
to care for. I believe the greatest contribution that phenomenology can offer is to provide a systematic 
means for discerning this miraculous wholeness in all portions of the natural and humanmade worlds. 
 
Notes 
1. In this book, Worster emphasizes that the central concern of ecology is “the interdependence of living 
things,” though he also demonstrates that ecology as a science often understands these interrelationships 
in a much different way from the “ecological point of view,” which he defines as “a search for holistic or 
integrated perception, an emphasis on interdependence and relatedness in nature, and an intense desire to 
restore man to a place of intimate intercourse with the vast organism that constitutes the earth” (Worster 
1994, p. 82). A useful discussion of the many different conceptual strands of the ecological point of view 
is Hay 2002. Besides Worster’s book, valuable discussions of the nature of ecology as a science include 
Keller and Golley 2000; and Pickett, Kolasa, and Jones 1994. 
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2. Important works that relate phenomenology and the ecological point of view include Abram 1996; 
Brown and Toadvine 2003; Fisher 2002; Foltz 1995; Hay 2002, chap. 5; Ihde 2002, chap. 8; Langer 1990;  
McWhorter 1992; Relph  1981, esp. chaps. 7-12; Seamon 1979, 1993; Seamon and Mugerauer 1985; 
Seamon and Zajonc 1998; von Eckartsberg 1971a & b; Zimmerman 1990. Also central are 
phenomenological efforts to understand place and place experience—see Casey 1993, 1997; Hay 2002, 
chap. 6; Malpas 1999; Mugerauer 1994; Relph 1976; Seamon 2000; Stefanovic 2000. 
 
3. As far as I know, ecologist Mark Riegner (1993) first used the term “phenomenological ecology,” 
which he defined as “a descriptive approach that strives to interpret patterns of relationships both within 
and among landscapes” (ibid., p. 211). He emphasized that the approach also applies to human 
landscapes. Drawing on Riegner, I incorporated the term in the subtitle of my Dwelling, Seeing, and 
Designing: Toward a Phenomenological Ecology (Seamon 1993), the volume in which Riegner’s article 
appears. 
 
Other related labels for this field of study include “eco-phenomenology” (Brown and Toadvine 2003), 
“ecopsychology” (e.g., Fisher 2004; Roberts 1998), “experiential ecological psychology” (von 
Eckartsberg 1971a, p. 73), and “existential ecology” (von Eckartsberg 1971b, p. 377). In my own work, I 
have more often used the label “environmental and architectural phenomenology” because the expression 
offers one way to hold natural and humanmade worlds together—a union that is crucial if we are to 
understand the full range of ways by which people and world commingle. For updates on research in this 
multidisciplinary field, see the Environmental and Architectural Phenomenology Newsletter, published 
three times a year since 1990 (www.arch.ksu.edu/seamon/EAP.html). 
 
4. It is unclear why Merleau-Ponty and later phenomenological researchers have largely ignored extended 
body-subject actions and the particular manner in which qualities of the world might contribute to their 
unfolding (but see Allen 2004; Hill 1985; Toombs 1995). In Phenomenology of Perception, chapter 3, 
“The Spatiality of One’s Own Body and Motility,” Merleau-Ponty provides a number of examples—a 
lady’s accommodating a hat with a feather, a motorist’s driving his automobile, a blind man’s using his 
walking stick, a typist’s striking typewriter keys, an organist’s playing the organ—to describe how body-
subject automatically adjusts actions through movement space so there are no disruptions or accidents 
(ibid., pp. 143-46). 
 
The most significant (but brief) example that Merleau-Ponty provides of larger-scale actions of body-
subject is his own bodily mastery of his apartment: “My flat is, for me, not a set of closely associated 
images. It remains a familiar domain round about me only as long as I still have ‘in my hands’ or ‘in my 
legs’ the main distances and directions involved, and as long as from my body intentional threads run out 
towards it” (ibid., p. 130). It is this same unselfconscious awareness “in the hands” and “in the legs,” 
extended over wider spatial and temporal scales, which is the lived foundation of body and time-space 
routines. 
 
In his The Sense of Space, philosopher David Morris (2004) seeks a language to make Merleau-Ponty’s 
language of body-subject more dynamic by demonstrating “how the moving body is inherently open to 
the world” (ibid., p. viii). He identifies what he calls “the crossing of body and world,” by which he 
means “a flowing threshold that overlaps body and world” (p. 5). Oddly, though this language would 
easily accommodate wider-scale “crossings” suggested by body and time-space routines, Morris does not 
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identify such a possibility, even though he emphasizes that “the sense of space is rooted in that crossing” 
(ibid., p. 5). Perhaps the most useful notion he develops is what he calls sens—“meaning as arising within 
directed movement that crosses body and world” (ibid., p. 24). He writes: “There is sens within the body’s 
moving directedness toward the world. Sens… is neither a meaning in the head nor is it interior to 
subjectivity, it is a meaning within a movement that crosses body and world” (ibid.). In the time-space 
extensions of body-subject referred to here as body and time-space routines, one might speak of an 
environmental and place sens. 
 
5. The reader at this point may well wonder whether place ballets actually exist. As far as I know, there 
have been no definitive empirical studies of real-world place ballets. In describing her neighborhood 
stretch of New York City’s Hudson Street as a street ballet, Jacobs (1961, pp. 50-54) offers an 
impressionistic account of the many different people present for different personal ends: her putting out 
the garbage, neighboring proprietors opening their storefronts, children walking by on their way to school. 
Jacobs also described how the nature and tenor of this street ballet changes over the course of the day and 
evening. 
 
In a participant-observation study, geographer Christina Nordin and I (Seamon and Nordin 1980) used 
place ballet to examine the outdoor market of Varberg, Sweden, a coastal town of about 20,000 people 
south of Gothenberg. Located in the center of town in an open cobblestone square about the size of a 
football field, the market is open all year on Wednesdays and Saturdays from 8 a.m. to 1 p.m. From 
interviews and observations, we determined that approximately two-thirds of all buyers at the market are 
regulars, whereas the great majority of sellers are regulars. 
 
The great difficulty in demonstrating place ballet is the considerable number of participants whose actions 
and experiences must somehow be observed and registered. Urban researcher William Whyte used time-
lapse photography to record place use, and one of the most convincing accounts of a freewheeling 
regularity is his time-lapse record of sitting-ledge behavior at New York City’s Seagram Plaza (Whyte 
1980, pp. 69-73; appendix B). 
 
Another important contribution to exploring place ballet is sociologist Ray Oldenburg’s The Great Good 
Place (Oldenburg 1989), which studies informal meeting places outside home and work where people 
gather for good company—cafes, pubs, coffee shops, and the like. Oldenburg emphasizes that a key 
ingredient in these places is the “regulars, whatever their number on any given occasion, who feel at home 
in a place and set the tone of conviviality” (ibid., p 34). 
 
Political scientist Douglas Rae (2003) gives indirect confirmation of 19th-century urban place ballet in his 
study of traditional urban place founded in animated street life and vibrant city districts. His real-world 
focus is the shifting social and economic geography of the streets, neighborhoods, and districts of New 
Haven, Connecticut, the city he draws on to typify traditional urbanism in America. Largely through 
archival evidence, he demonstrates the crucial importance of a locally-grounded network of human 
relationships founded in and sustaining urban businesses, civic organizations, and municipal government. 
 
Especially relevant for the possibility of place ballet is Rae’s description of the intimate connectedness 
between residents and their urban world—so much so, Rae suggests, that most residents could not 
imagine themselves in any way separate or distinct from that world. One can readily imagine that the 
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world of these urban citizens would involve routine and repetition grounded in the places of the city that 
made up their urban lifeworld: 
 
A fully grounded city citizen would work full time within her city, would live her nights and 
evenings there, would educate her children there, would routinely shop in stores there, would 
worship there if anywhere, would live in a social network pinned down on the city. Its streets, 
saloons, restaurants, corner stores, plant gates, ballparks, and many more very particular and 
localized features would organize her life. It would be hard to say who she is without reference to 
her city (ibid., p. 113-14). 
 
From the vantage point of humanistic geographer Yi-Fu Tuan, place ballet would exemplify a field of care —
i.e., any place that comes to be known through prolonged experience and that fosters a sense of comfort and 
attachment. One striking example of the significance of a field of care is provided in psychiatrist Mindy 
Thompson Fullilove’s Root Shock—a study of the traumatic impact that urban renewal has had on African-
American neighborhoods (Fullilove 2004). The enforced segregation of the black ghetto was racist and 
ethically wrong, but Fullilove demonstrates that one of its strengths was as a place “where people shared with 
one another… People had in common the pressures of daily life. People had in common the struggle to 
survive in the face of racism. And though such pressures might turn people against one another, in those 
places it made for a great deal of kindness” (ibid., pp. 121-22). 
 
Fullilove demonstrates that this “field of kindness” arose from a strong sense of place solidarity generated 
in part by an outside-imposed spatial boundedness: “In the compact space of the ghetto, a tight field of 
activity was created, through which acts and words might pass quickly. It was possible to know of 
someone’s pain or glory, and to respond when needed. Actions toward others were permitted and 
expected. They were extended with the consent of the community, and received in the same vein. This 
passage through the field of the community, with the consent of the community, meant that the sense of 
kindness was everywhere, at least within the community” (ibid., p. 123). 
 
One of the most destructive aspects of urban renewal was the dismantling of these fields of kindness: 
“The shattering of the field… had an enormous effect on kindness because kindness was passed through 
the field. In the aftermath of urban renewal, individuals were preoccupied with making a new life, and 
perhaps they could not be as kind as they had been previously. At the same time, given the loss of the 
field, the kindness did not extend as far as it had before. The buffering effect of kindness was lost, and the 
negative behaviors and attitudes that had always been present were given greater scope. Given the other 
difficulties that were to come, the decline in kindness, however small, triggered a downward trend in 
kindness over the ensuing decades” (ibid.). 
 
Fullilove emphasizes that the ghetto’s field of care was rooted in an animated street life, including street 
ballet (ibid., pp. 18-19). In short, place regularity sustained responsibility for and love of place, which in 
turn helped make sure that place regularity continued—until derailed by urban renewal, which “replaced 
people-friendly blocks and structures with megablocks and megabuildings surrounded by parking lots” 
(ibid., p. 92). 
 
6. Hillier’s derivation of statistical and graphic indices is a significant achievement and represents, from a 
phenomenological perspective, a powerful example of quantitative measures that serve to allow the 
phenomenon to appear (rather than reduce and distort the phenomenon as so much quantitative analysis 
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typically does). Hillier attributes the forthrightness of his measures to “trying to describe an order that is 
already present in the system” (Hillier and Hanson 1984, p. 45). 
 
On the other hand, it must also be said that Hillier’s mathematical measures derive from configurational 
properties only, thus other important aspects of urban place—e.g., land uses, functional activities, 
building types, and user density—are not considered. In his most recent work, Hillier claims to 
demonstrate that “movement in the urban grid is, other things being equal, generated by the configuration 
of the grid itself” (Hillier 1996, p. 5). He argues that “the structuring of movement by the grid leads, 
through multiplier effects, to dense patterns of mixed-use encounter that characterize the spatially 
successful city” (ibid., p. 6; also see pp. 167-70). One helpful effort to integrate spatial configuration with 
these other aspects of urban place is Bentley et al. 1985. 
 
7. Eventually, one must ask if, in the real place, the pathways of highest integration are actually the most 
used and the liveliest in terms of pedestrian activity. To answer this question, Hillier and his researchers 
have gone to the actual pathways and counted pedestrians. Overall, results indicate a high correlation 
between high integration values and animated streets. See Hillier 1996, p. 161; Read 1999, pp. 251-64. 
 
8. The most complete set of Goethe’s scientific writings in English is Goethe 1988. For examples of 
recent Goethean phenomenology, see Seamon and Zajonc 1998. The best single overview of Goethean 
science, including its phenomenological significance, is Bortoft 1996; also important is Lehrs 1958. For a 
helpful overview of academic evaluations of Goethean science, see Amrine et al. 1987. 
 
9. I am not qualified to evaluate the scientific validity of Goethe’s color theory. Until recently, the 
preponderance of scientific opinion concluded that Goethe’ theory is subjectivist and without the 
foundations of the “wave length” theory of light that dominates color research today. On the other hand, 
there has been some experimental work, especially the color experiments of Edwin Land (inventor of instant 
photography), which cannot adequately be explained by “wave length” and, in fact, makes more sense in 
terms of Goethe’s theory, particularly the importance of a light-dark edge for generating colors and the 
active role of the eye in contributing to the color experience (Land 1959, Zajonc 1993). 
 
In his central experiment using two light projectors, Land (Land 1959, Zajonc 1993, pp. 190-99) projected 
on a screen a synchronized image produced by two colored lights—one yellow, the other orange—passing 
through two black-and-white transparencies shot of a still life. One black-and-white transparency was 
taken through a red filter, the other through a green filter (the fact that the filters were red and green is 
immaterial to the experiment as are the projected colors of yellow and orange). 
 
One would expect that the resulting still life on the screen would appear in gradations of yellow-orange 
but, amazingly, what one really sees is a full-colored reproduction of the original still life, and this done 
with two colored lights and black-and-white images! Land writes that “we are forced to the astonishing 
conclusion that the rays are not in themselves color-making. Rather they are bearers of information that 
the eye uses to assign appropriate colors to various objects in the image” (Land, 1959, p. 2). 
 
From Goethe’s perspective, the first provocative component of Land’s experiment is the black-and-white 
transparencies, which could be understood to provide a great number of varying darkness-light “edges” 
that the two separate projector lights then pass along and through. One could infer a great number of 
black-white edges, each accommodating a particular color edge. 
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Though I haven’t emphasized the point here, Goethe also believed strongly in the eye’s active role in 
seeing. Goethe spoke of “the law of required change”—the idea that “the eye is compelled to a form of 
opposition… quickly merging opposites and striving to achieve a whole” (Zajonc 1993, p. 196). Part I of 
Theory of Color, dealing with physiological colors—i.e., colors in the eye—describes colored after 
images and color shadows as everyday examples of this law. 
 
Colored shadows arise when there are two light sources (one that is white) casting shadows thrown by an 
object. If the colored light is green, for example, the object’s shadow cast by the green light and 
illuminated by the white light will be red, even thought there is no red light anywhere. This appearance of 
red, says Goethe, is the instantaneous tendency of the eye to supplement the dominant green lightness of 
the scene with a red in the darker shadow. 
 
Colored shadows are especially relevant in regard to Land’s experiments because all colored shadows, 
like Land’s complete color rendition of the still life, occur instantaneously and must require an immediate 
response of the eye, which in this case is an immediate rendition of all the colors of the still life, perhaps 
because of the “infinite” number of gradations of black-white edges offered by the two superimposed 
black-and-white transparences. 
 
10. In part, Bortoft’s understanding here derives from Martin Heidegger’s distinction between “belonging 
together” vs. “belonging together” (Heideggger 1969, p. 29). In the former situation, parts not necessarily 
of a piece are brought arbitrarily together. In other words, the parts are together but they may not really 
belong together. The latter situation is much more real because the parts all necessarily belong together, 
and this belonging founds the possibility of really seeing how all the parts are together and the whole they 
make. One of the most effective aspects of Goethe’s color theory is its discovery of how particular colors 
“belong together” because of the light-darkness dialectic. Goethean science attempts to find this 
belonging together in regard to the particular phenomenon studied. 
 
11. One remarkable aspect of place ballet is that, though it is grounded in the natural attitude and routine, 
it can also evoke novelty, excitement, and surprise. The serendipity of encounters, the possibility of 
newcomers and outsiders, the sense of place ambience—these qualities may give a taken-for-granted 
place a sense of exhilaration and allure, all housed in the triad of habituality. 
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